U.S. DOJ Unveils White-Collar Enforcement Priorities and Corporate Enforcement Policy Revisions

On May 12, 2025, the Head of the U.S. Department of Justice Criminal Division, Matthew Galeotti, provided the Trump administration’s first comprehensive articulation of white-collar priorities and revised corporate enforcement policies in remarks delivered at the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association Anti-Money Laundering and Financial Crimes Conference. The remarks, together with memoranda and updated guidance documents posted the same day, look to provide transparent, streamlined, and more certain incentives for voluntary self-disclosure (VSD). They also specify concrete rewards available to companies that miss the mark on the criteria for VSD or have aggravating circumstances (nonprosecution agreements). Specifically, Galeotti:

• (1) Identified enforcement priorities that were also set out in a white-collar enforcement plan, that is, a memorandum entitled “Focus, Fairness, and Efficiency in the Fight Against White-Collar Crime,” published on the Criminal Division’s website. The priorities include longstanding focal points alongside new priority areas consistent with the administration’s “America First” agenda, which include combating government program and trade fraud; Chinese money laundering; offenses involving Chinese-affiliated companies listed on U.S. exchanges that create risks to the investing public; terrorism; and sanctions evasion.
• (2) Announced revisions to the Criminal Division’s Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy (CEP) that are intended to streamline self-disclosure incentives and provide a clear path to a declination. The revisions include a flowchart in the new policy designed to clarify the outcomes that may result from self-disclosure and distill how the CEP operates in the absence of self-disclosures.
• (3) Announced further revisions to the Criminal Division’s monitorship policies, signaling that compliance monitorships are strongly disfavored and, to the extent they are used, prosecutors will be highly attuned to cost and scoping. Companies should expect to see fewer monitors, and the Criminal Division is currently reviewing all existing monitorships.
• (4) Modified the Criminal Division’s Corporate Whistleblower Awards Pilot Program to attract additional tips concerning different priority offenses, which include procurement and federal program fraud; trade, tariff, and customs fraud; violations of federal immigration law; and violations involving sanctions, material support of foreign terrorist organizations, or those that facilitate cartels and Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs), including money laundering, narcotics, and Controlled Substances Act violations.

Overall, these announcements make clear that the Criminal Division is focused on rewarding “good corporate citizens” that have effective compliance programs. With these announcements, corporations now have new tools to argue for leniency regardless of the decisions they make on self-disclosure, but they should also be mindful that the administration will not hesitate to bring enforcement actions in certain priority areas.

Here is additional detail on these developments:

(1) Enforcement Priorities

Galeotti announced a comprehensive list of white-collar enforcement priorities in his speech and the enforcement plan, which directed Criminal Division prosecutors to pursue crimes in 10 “high-impact areas”: (1) waste, fraud, and abuse, including healthcare fraud and federal program and procurement fraud; (2) trade and customs fraud; (3) fraud perpetrated through Chinese variable interest entities (VIEs); (4) fraud that victimizes U.S. investors, individuals, and markets; (5) national security and cartel-related offenses, including those committed by financial institutions; (6) material support by corporations to foreign terrorist organizations; (7) complex money laundering, including by Chinese money-laundering organizations; (8) certain violations of the Controlled Substances Act and the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, including unlawful distribution of opioids by companies; (9) bribery and associated money laundering that “impact U.S. national interests, undermine U.S. national security, harm the competitiveness of U.S. businesses, and enrich foreign corrupt officials;” and (10) digital asset prosecutions that focus on individuals who victimize digital asset investors or those who use digital assets in furtherance of criminal offenses.

The list includes priorities consistent with the administration’s prior announcements, such as government program fraud, complex money laundering, and fraud victimizing U.S. investors. Companies operating in China should take particular note of references to VIEs, described by Galeotti as “typically Chinese-affiliated companies listed on U.S. exchanges that carry significant risks to the investing public.” Notably, the list — that is, priorities 9 and 10 — includes foreign bribery and digital asset matters, despite prior Department-wide memoranda circumscribing the focus of such investigations and the President’s executive order pausing enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.

(2) CEP Revisions

Galeotti unveiled key revisions to the CEP in an effort to streamline incentives for corporations to voluntarily self-disclose and provide additional certainty about the benefits available. These changes do not alter the essence of what the CEP has long offered, however: leniency in return for self-disclosures and commitments to cooperation and remedial efforts. The revised CEP, accompanied by a helpful flowchart, now has three parts.

In Part I of the revised CEP, companies will now receive a declination (rather than a presumption of a declination) if, in a reasonably prompt timeframe, they voluntarily self-disclose misconduct, fully cooperate, timely and appropriately remediate, and pay applicable disgorgement/forfeiture or restitution/victim compensation payments — and if they have no aggravating circumstances. Notably, the definition of “aggravating circumstances” is more narrow than in the older version, as it limits the definition of “recidivism” to a “criminal adjudication or resolution within the last five years based on similar misconduct by the entity engaged in the current misconduct.”

Part II of the revised CEP applies to companies that do not qualify for a declination laid out in Part I because they made “good faith” attempts to voluntarily self-disclose (termed “near miss” VSDs in the CEP) or had aggravating factors warranting resolutions. This would include companies that disclosed only after — unbeknownst to them — the Criminal Division had already become aware of the misconduct at issue. For these companies, the CEP directs prosecutors to (1) resolve the matter via a nonprosecution agreement, (2) allow a resolution term length of less than three years, (3) not require an independent compliance monitor monitorship, and (4) provide a reduction of 75% off the low end of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (USSG) range. This change is consistent with recent resolutions announced during the prior administration in which similar benefits were discretionarily provided to companies.

Part III of the revised CEP addresses companies not eligible for Part I or II. Here, the CEP continues to offer a reduction of no more than 50% off the USSG range for these circumstances but leaves it up to the discretion of the prosecutors to determine the specific percentage of the reduction for cooperation and remedial efforts.

Of note, the updated CEP presents a new definition of VSD, which now allows a disclosure to be voluntary as long as a company has no preexisting obligation to disclose the misconduct to the Department of Justice. In the prior version of the CEP, disclosure was not considered voluntary if there was a preexisting obligation to disclose arising from anywhere, such as in industry-specific regulations. Companies operating in highly regulated industries should thus work with counsel to closely analyze whether the calculus has changed, particularly given the list of priority offenses articulated by Criminal Division leadership. Finally, the updated VSD definition also removes language from the older version of the CEP, which required that the company disclose “all relevant, non-privileged facts known to it, including all relevant facts and evidence about all individuals involved in or responsible for the misconduct at issue, including individuals inside and outside of the company regardless of their position, status, or seniority.” This last change removes language regarding individual accountability that heightened VSD requirements from those in place in the first Trump administration.

(3) Monitors

First, Galeotti confirmed what practitioners have seen play out over the first few months of the administration: The Criminal Division is actively reviewing existing monitorships in an effort to narrow the scope of monitorships or terminate them altogether. Second, he made clear that companies can expect to see fewer monitorships in the future. The accompanying revised memorandum on monitor selection (1) clarifies factors prosecutors should consider in determining whether a monitor should be imposed, with a strong focus on cost, and (2) aims to ensure that when a monitor is imposed, prosecutors appropriately tailor and scope the monitor’s review and mandate, and again to reduce needless costs. Among other things, in deciding whether to impose a monitor, prosecutors are directed to examine the risk of recurrence of criminal conduct that significantly affects U.S. interests and consider the availability of other government oversight (e.g., regulators), the effectiveness and maturity of the compliance program at the time of the resolution, and whether a “company’s choice to take appropriate action against employees who were involved in and/or had supervisory responsibility for those involved in the misconduct reduces the likelihood of recurrence and therefore the need for a monitor.”

(4) Corporate Whistleblower Awards Pilot Program Revisions

Finally, Galeotti announced updates to the Corporate Whistleblower Awards Pilot Program, discussed in a previous Sidley alert available here. These revisions added areas in which the government seeks to attract tips that align with the administration’s priorities, consisting of (1) procurement and federal program fraud; (2) trade, tariff, and customs fraud; (3) violations by corporations of federal immigration law; and (4) violations involving sanctions, material support of foreign terrorist organizations, or those that facilitate cartels and TCOs, including money laundering, narcotics, and Controlled Substances Act violations. Notably, these revisions did not remove the prior priority areas for tips, which included foreign and domestic bribery, certain crimes involving financial institutions, and certain healthcare offenses. In light of these changes, compliance officers should calibrate their programs toward these heightened areas of whistleblower risk as relevant for their business lines and the jurisdictions in which they operate (i.e., areas with cartel activity).