Maryland District Court Relies on Loper Bright to Hold Written Consent for Telemarketing Calls Not Required

In Bradley v. DentalPlans.com, 2026 WL 788856 (D. Md. Mar. 20, 2026), a federal district court in Maryland held that the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA or Act) does not require written consent before a person can receive automated or prerecorded telemarketing calls. The decision adds to a growing list of post-Loper Bright cases rejecting a rule by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) requiring written (rather than verbal) consent.

Background

In 1991, Congress enacted the TCPA, which sought to restrict invasive telemarketing calls. Among other things, the TCPA prohibits calls made using automatic telephone dialing systems or an artificial or prerecorded voice without “the prior express consent of the called party.” The Act also authorizes the FCC to “prescribe regulations to implement” its provisions. In 2012, the Commission issued a regulation declaring that the TCPA permits telemarketing calls only when the called party has given “prior express written consent.”

Under the Chevron doctrine, courts generally deferred to the FCC’s view that the TCPA required written consent, and they frequently certified class actions alleging violation of that requirement. But after Loper Bright overruled Chevron, companies began challenging the FCC’s interpretation of the TCPA, arguing that the agency had impermissibly imposed a “written” consent requirement found nowhere in the statute’s text. Those challenges gained momentum after the Supreme Court’s decision in McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates, Inc. v. McKesson Corporation, which involved a similar FCC rule interpreting the TCPA. Applying Loper Bright, the Court held in McLaughlin that courts are not bound by an agency’s interpretation of a statute in civil enforcement proceedings and must instead independently interpret the statute’s meaning under ordinary principles of statutory construction.

In January 2025, the Eleventh Circuit became the first court of appeals to address the TCPA’s consent requirement post–Loper Bright. There, the court vacated a 2023 FCC rule that amended the written-consent requirement with additional obligations, reasoning that those obligations exceeded the ordinary statutory meaning of “prior express consent.” Earlier this year, the Fifth Circuit went one step further and expressly held that the FCC exceeded its statutory authority in imposing the written-consent requirement.

The Case

In 2018, Deborah Bradley signed up for a dental savings plan from DentalPlans.com. While signing up for the plan, she allegedly provided oral consent to receive prerecorded calls from the company but did not provide any written consent. When her savings plan expired, Bradley continued to receive prerecorded calls from DentalPlans urging her to renew the plan. Bradley sued DentalPlans on behalf of a class of former DentalPlans customers, alleging that DentalPlans had violated the TCPA’s consent requirement as interpreted by the FCC. The district court certified the class and denied DentalPlans’ motion for summary judgment. Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court issued McLaughlin. DentalPlans then sought reconsideration, arguing that Loper Bright and McLaughlin created a change in the controlling law.

On March 20, 2026, the district court granted reconsideration and decertified the class. The court explained that under Loper Bright and McLaughlin, it could no longer defer to the FCC’s interpretation of the TCPA simply because it was reasonable. Instead, the court looked to ordinary principles of statutory construction and agreed with the Eleventh and Fifth Circuits that the statute’s general consent requirement did not permit the FCC to impose a heightened and more specific written-consent requirement. The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the TCPA itself requires interpretive deference because, as the court explained, the TCPA does not delegate to the FCC authority to interpret the statute. Absent such a delegation, the court could not defer to the FCC’s view of the TCPA. The court thus concluded that Bradley’s oral consent satisfied the TCPA’s consent requirement.

Implications

The district court’s decision adds to a chorus of post–Loper Bright decisions holding that the FCC lacks the authority to require written consent under the TCPA. Class-action defendants in jurisdictions without binding authority should continue to draw on this growing body of persuasive authority to challenge lawsuits based on the FCC’s written-consent requirement. More broadly, the decision shows how legal issues under the TCPA that were once considered settled law are vulnerable to reconsideration under Loper and McLaughlin.