Skip to main content
Sidley Updates

Developments in Asia Restructuring: Potential Opportunities for Indian Debtors – CIRP and English Restructuring Plans

September 7, 2026
*This article was prepared in collaboration with the Restructuring & Insolvency team of AZB & Partners. https://www.azbpartners.com/
Dhevine Chandrapala (Partner, Sidley Austin)
Ee Ming Wong (Senior Managing Associate, Sidley Austin)
Nilang Desai (Partner, AZB Partners)
Suharsh Sinha (Partner, AZB Partners)1

Introduction

Modern capital structures are increasingly complex and cross-border, and accordingly, more innovative transaction structures often have to be formulated in order to deliver holistic financial restructurings. In particular, parallel corporate rescue processes are increasingly required across different jurisdictions to implement an effective cross-border debt restructuring of large corporate groups with debts in different jurisdictions. 

Since its introduction in 2020, the English restructuring plan (English RP) has become an effective cross-border restructuring tool. For reference, a high-level comparison of an English RP and process under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 (IBC) (the CIRP) is in the Appendix.

The successful restructuring in 2025 of Sino-Ocean Group (Sino Ocean) via an English RP and inter-conditional parallel Hong Kong scheme of arrangement (HK Scheme) is a useful illustration of the flexibility of the English RP as a restructuring tool to implement a large-scale cross-border restructuring of an Asian debtor in conjunction with corporate rescue processes in other Asian jurisdictions (including potentially the CIRP).

IBC and the CIRP

Background

The IBC came into force in 2016 to address systemic weaknesses in India’s restructuring and insolvency regime, consolidating multiple laws and providing for a new structured insolvency process. Before the IBC, India did not have a holistic regime for the reorganization of insolvent companies.

Under the IBC, the CIRP can be initiated by a creditor or a corporate debtor filing a petition with the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT).2 Once a petition is admitted, the in-court restructuring process begins, and if this fails, the corporate debtor will enter liquidation.3

Although an approved resolution plan can compromise the obligations of other obligors (i.e., not only the entity subject to proceedings)4, the moratorium under the IBC will apply only to the debtor that is undergoing CIRP5 — that is, it is necessary for each obligor to enter its own process if it wishes to take advantage of the moratorium/stay on enforcement acts under the IBC.

Committee of creditors

A central feature of the IBC is control of the debtor transferring from management to creditors. Once an application is admitted, an interim resolution professional is appointed by the NCLT to receive and collate creditor claims,6 a moratorium is imposed,7 and unrelated financial creditors form a committee of creditors (the CoC).8 Once formed, the CoC appoints a resolution professional (Indian Resolution Professional),9 who could also be the interim resolution professional, to manage the debtor’s affairs. The Indian Resolution Professional carries on the day-to-day functioning of the corporate debtor,10 having been granted the powers of the board of directors of the corporate debtor,11 but cannot unilaterally take significant actions12 without the CoC’s prior approval13.

The CoC negotiates and votes on a resolution plan, which is deemed approved if it secures the approval of at least 66% of the unrelated financial creditors in value.14 Unlike in England, creditors are not placed into classes for voting, and although a sanctioned resolution plan binds all creditors (financial and operational),15 only unrelated financial creditors16 constitute the CoC17.

Limitations of the CIRP as a Standalone Process

While the CIRP under the IBC has significantly improved creditor and investor confidence in India18, it, as a standalone process, has limitations in circumstances where the debtor group has a complex corporate and capital structure involving other foreign jurisdictions. In particular: 

  • Only Indian-registered companies are eligible: The IBC applies only to companies and limited liability partnerships with their registered offices in India,19 meaning Indian courts cannot exercise jurisdiction over foreign-registered companies. Consequently, the IBC is ineffective for Indian debtor groups with an international capital and financing structure — for instance, those with borrowers strategically incorporated outside India for raising finance (e.g., the Cayman Islands or the UK).
  • The rule in Gibbs: An IBC resolution process cannot overcome the rule in Gibbs (bearing in mind that foreign-currency-denominated debt of Indian companies is often English law) unless the relevant creditor submits to the jurisdiction of the Indian courts. If there is English debt in the structure, proceeding under the IBC means there is a risk of certain foreign creditors not engaging with the Indian CIRP and seeking a higher recovery under Gibbs, particularly with respect to assets that are overseas at the time or in the future.
  • No retention of equity: The CIRP does not impose a blanket prohibition on all promoters; a promoter who does not trigger any of the disqualifications under Section 29A remains eligible. Further, though IBC does not necessarily require a full write-down of equity, that generally ensues due to erosion of equity value and change in management. Technically, lenders (and the successful bidder) may choose to retain original equity in the company undergoing CIRP, if they consider it necessary.
    Further, despite having their equity squeezed out, CIRP does allow equity value to be paid to the shareholders if the resolution amount received exceeds the claims of all external stakeholders who appear higher in the statutory waterfall.20 
  • Section 29A: In a CIRP, any entity that wants to submit a resolution plan for a corporate debtor must comply with Section 29A of the IBC.21 Section 29A of the IBC bars persons suffering from certain disqualifications from submitting a resolution plan for a corporate debtor. These include (i) an undischarged insolvent, (ii) a willful defaulter, identified as such under the guidelines issued by the Reserve Bank of India (India’s central bank) (RBI), (iii) an entity that holds or manages an account that has been designated as a nonperforming asset by lenders for more than one year, according to the guidelines issued by the RBI, (iv) persons convicted of specific offenses, and (v) a person who has executed a guarantee in respect of a corporate debtor undergoing CIRP, which has been invoked but not paid, etc. Accordingly, an owner-manager or sponsor that suffers from these defects will have a mandatory change of governance control and “lose” governance control of the entity/business from the date of approval of a resolution plan of a third-party bidder by the adjudicating authority. This is subject to the fact that an owner-manager or sponsor would have effectively lost “governance” control of the debtor at the commencement of CIRP itself, when the board of directors of the debtor is suspended, and the insolvency professional exercises the powers of the board of the debtor. However, the equity of the debtor typically changes hands formally at the time of approval of the resolution plan.22
    As a corollary, an owner-manager or sponsor who is not disqualified under Section 29A of the IBC may bid for the company afresh, and, with infusion of fresh capital, regain equity control of the company.
  • Procedure: There remains a perception that the CIRP process in practice is subject to procedural delays and there is some degree of inconsistency in how the lower Indian courts have decided CIRP cases. However, recent amendments to the IBC have introduced provisions that have reconciled inconsistent judgments, and the proposed efficiencies are intended to reduce timelines in the resolution process. 
  • Creditor-led process: The CIRP is predominantly a creditor-led process (as opposed to debtor-in-possession), whereby the Indian Resolution Professional manages the debtor’s affairs subject to the supervision of the CoC. This may not be attractive to a sponsor that wishes to retain control over the restructuring process and retain the entity/business.
    The IBC provides a few avenues where a sponsor or promoter may continue to maintain control over a debtor during the insolvency resolution process and regain or retain equity shareholding after the insolvency resolution process, although creditors continue to maintain supervisory authority during the insolvency resolution process in such cases. These options include the Creditor-initiated Insolvency Resolution Process (CIIRP)23.24

CIIRP

The CIIRP was introduced in 2026. It is a creditor-led resolution approach that allows for out-of-court commencement of insolvency proceedings by select financial institutions. Under the CIIRP, the debtor remains in control of the company.

The CIIRP involves

  1. initiation by select financial institutions specified by the Centre25
  2. the debtor remaining in control of day-to-day operations;
  3. the CoC that has overall supervision of the resolution process and must approve certain identified actions, which would typically have a substantial impact on the operations of the debt (e.g., raising interim finance, change in capital structure, alteration in the constitutional documents of the creditor)26 and may also, upon a resolution passed by at least 66% of the voting share of the CoC, close the CIIRP and have the debtor admitted into CIRP; and
  4. an Indian Resolution Professional appointed by the financial creditor initiating the CIIRP27 to take responsibility for certain functions (e.g., verification and collation of claims, constitution of the CoC, preparation of information memorandum in respect of a resolution plan, inviting eligible prospective resolution applicants to submit resolution plans, and presenting such plans to the committee of creditors).28 The Indian Resolution Professional may attend meetings of members, board of directors, and committee of directors, as the case may be, of the debtor and shall have the power to reject resolutions of the board under certain circumstances.29

Although theCIIRP has been enacted, the CIIRP may only be initiated by select financial institutions specified by the Centre, a list of which has not been notified. The trigger for initiating CIIRP is a payment default of INR 10 million.

The CIIRP gives more flexibility to promoters, to come up with a negotiated solution that balances their mutual interests without having to completely overhaul the management of a debtor. Given the time taken ordinarily in CIRPs, this may be preferable for creditors in certain situations.

Equity retention in CIIRP will work in a substantially similar manner to a CIRP from a statutory perspective. In practice, however, given the high likelihood of a promoter’s submitting the best plan, they may come to an agreement with the lenders to retain the original equity structure of the company.

Note that a CIIRP requires a promoter submitting a plan to be compliant with Section 29A of the IBC. Additionally, an open bidding process must be conducted (on similar lines as the CIRP, with condensed timelines), which allows third-party bidders to bid for the debtor. If a third-party bidder submits a resolution plan that is better than the plan offered by the owner-manager or the sponsor, equity control may move to the new bidder if the lenders find such a plan more lucrative.

A CIIRP may be used in conjunction with an English RP to address English law debts of Indian debtors. As discussed more extensively below, an Indian insolvency process may be recognized before English courts under the cross-border insolvency regime recently introduced by amendments to the IBC (but awaiting relevant rules to be brought in), and an English RP may reciprocally be recognized in India under the same, or under other avenues of recognition of foreign judgements. 

English RP

Process

An English RP is a company-led process, where, following an application for a meeting of creditors/members to be convened being made, a hearing is held to address jurisdiction and creditor class composition — following this hearing, the court directs creditors/members affected by the plan to vote on the proposal before the sanction hearing — a class approves a restructuring plan if 75% by value of those voting support it.

The court can approve a plan where one or more classes have dissented (i.e., cross-class cramdown) if these conditions are met: 

  • Condition A: The court is satisfied that if the restructuring plan were to be sanctioned, no members of the dissenting class would be any worse off than in the “relevant alternative” (the “no worse off” test).
  • Condition B: The plan has been approved by at least 75% in value of those voting from at least one class of creditors, who, in the “relevant alternative,” would receive payment or would have a genuine economic interest in the plan company.

Even if the above conditions are satisfied, the court retains discretion as to whether to sanction a restructuring plan.

Overseas companies

In contrast to the IBC, an English RP is available to non-English companies, provided they have “sufficient connection” to England30.

Sino-Ocean Group

In 2025, Sino Ocean successfully implemented a restructuring of its offshore existing debt of c.US$6 billion (Plan Debt) via an English RP (the Plan) and interconditional, parallel HK Scheme.

Following the restructuring of Hong Kong Airlines in 2023 (which also combined an English RP with a HK Scheme), Sino Ocean is the latest example of an Asian debtor using an English RP in conjunction with a foreign corporate rescue process.

The Plan Debt was split across four classes:

Tranche / Debt

Gov. Law

US$m

Class A Existing Syndicated Loans guaranteed by Sino Ocean

English and Hong Kong

2,050,770

Class B Unsecured Notes issued by a special purpose vehicle (SPV) and guaranteed by Sino Ocean

English

1,986,448

Class C Unsecured Notes issued by two SPVs and guaranteed by Sino Ocean

English

1,293,877

Class D Subordinated Perpetual Notes issued by an SPV and guaranteed by Sino Ocean

English

652,095

Total:

5,983,190

The Plan was part of Sino Ocean’s wider restructuring, with the HK Scheme being proposed by a subsidiary of Sino Ocean, Sino-Ocean Land (Hong Kong) Limited (Sino-Ocean HK Land). The HK Scheme comprised the same Class A debts (governed by Hong Kong law) to be compromised under the Plan.

Sino-Ocean HK Land was the primary borrower of each debt, and the parallel HK Scheme ensured recognition of the compromise of the Class A debt under Hong Kong law, necessary due to the rule in Gibbs, which applies both in England and in Hong Kong and states that a debt obligation can be discharged only by a legal process in the jurisdiction of its governing law. An exception to Gibbs is the relevant creditor submitting to the foreign jurisdiction (e.g., by voting in the foreign process).

Utility of English RPs for Indian debtors

Sino Ocean is a useful illustration of its flexibility as a restructuring tool in conjunction with other corporate rescue processes. In particular:

  • Ability to select in-scope debts: An English RP generally permits debtors to pick and choose debts to be included within the scope of the restructuring. This is generally not possible in a CIRP. The ability to “surgically” select indebtedness was a motivation for Fossil (the U.S.-based fashion retailer) to use an English RP, as opposed to Chapter 11 (a process where debtors are also unable to specifically select debts), to restructure its New York–law-existing bonds in November 202531.
  • Debtor in possession: In an English RP, the debtor remains in control, and shareholders are afforded the right to vote if their rights are affected by the plan. The consent of the debtor is also a necessity for an English RP to be sanctioned, unlike in IBC, where creditors have the right to initiate CIRP against a corporate debtor.
  • Effective discharge of English debt: The English RP will be effective in discharging English-law-governed debt (bearing in mind that foreign-currency-denominated debt of Indian companies is often governed by English law). The CIRP process, in contrast, cannot do so due to the rule in Gibbs.
  • Cross-class cramdown: Under an English RP, it is possible to cross-class cram down hostile English law debt with foreign law debt (as was done in Sino Ocean). If an Indian debtor has hostile English law debt and significant debt of another governing law (e.g., Indian), it may be possible to use the foreign law debt to cram down the English law debt in an English RP. If the creditors of a debtor can be meaningfully categorized into distinct classes, it is possible for the assenting class(es) of creditors, by way of their majority approval, to cram down the noncooperative class(es) of creditors.
  • Intraclass differentiation: At the discretion of the court, it is possible for creditors in the same class not to be treated in a pari passu manner, with the leave of the court, where there are good reasons for the same. In contrast, there exists extensive jurisprudence from Indian courts holding that similarly placed creditors cannot be treated differently in a CIRP under the IBC. Therefore, an English RP would be favorable for creditors who might want more flexibility in determining the specifics of distribution of proceeds of the insolvency resolution process.
  • Retention of equity: Sino Ocean demonstrates that existing shareholders can retain their equity interests in an English RP. The Plan was the first English RP where existing shareholders kept a substantial proportion of equity in the postrestructured company, justified on the basis that maintaining the company’s state-owned enterprise status was in the best interest of all creditors. The absence of a “no absolute priority” rule in England means an English RP allows for the possibility of existing shareholders to retain shareholding. Whilst recent English case law (including the Court of Appeal’s decision in Petrofac) provides an an increased burden on companies to demonstrate that the benefits of a plan are fair, Sino Ocean provides a precedent for equity retention.

The above features give rise to four possibilities for an Indian company with English-law-governed debt to use the English RP:

  • Option 1: Parallel CIRP and English RP
  • Option 2: Parallel CIIRP (once effective) and English RP
  • Option 3: English RP and recognition in India
  • Option 4: English RP and parallel scheme of arrangement in India

Each is considered in turn below.

Option 1: Parallel CIRP and English RP

This option may be attractive for Indian companies with mostly Indian-law-governed debt but with a smaller English holdout debt that does not submit to the jurisdiction of the Indian CIRP by relying on the rule in Gibbs. In this scenario, the Indian company (or a cooperative creditor of the company) could initiate a CIRP in India, pursuant to which a CoC and Indian Resolution Professional would be appointed. To address the holdout English debt, the Indian Resolution Professional, on behalf of the Indian debtor, could apply to the English courts to propose an English RP in the UK and use the larger Indian debt to potentially cram down the English law debt (not dissimilar to Sino Ocean).

The main drawback to this approach is that existing management would not be able to remain in control of the company, as the CIRP requires the company’s affairs to be managed by the Indian Resolution Professional under the supervision of the CoC. As such, this may not be a preferred option for sponsors who wish to remain in control of the restructuring process. Practically, there will also need to be a majority group of other creditors who are supportive and will be active participants in the process (e.g., provide timely directions to the Indian Resolution Professional) to implement the English RP.

There are precedents for an Indian CIRP and a foreign insolvency regime proceeding concurrently and cooperatively. In 2019, Dutch insolvency proceedings were commenced against Jet Airways in the Netherlands, and UK liquidation proceedings were commenced against the same company, all while a CIRP was initiated against the airline in India. Notwithstanding the absence of a legislative framework governing cross-border insolvency in India, the appellate authority directed the Dutch administrator and the Indian resolution professional to enter into a cross-border insolvency protocol, facilitating cooperation and coordination between the two proceedings.32 The UK liquidator and the Indian resolution professional also cooperated. However, this was ad hoc and relied on comity.

There is also a technical point as to whether the English courts will recognize the Indian Resolution Professional’s control over the company and its standing to apply on behalf of the company for the English RP. This issue has yet to be tested before the English courts and as such remains novel. 

Recent amendments to the IBC have introduced a cross-border insolvency regime covering recognition of foreign judgments, subject to rules to be made by the Centre.33 The Cross Border Insolvency Rules/Regulations Committee in 2021 recommended an adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency with some modifications, with reciprocal recognition of insolvency processes.34 If the same is ultimately followed under the IBC, it may provide an avenue for recognition of the authority of the Indian Resolution Professional by English courts.

Encouragingly, in 2025, the Singapore High Court in Re Compuage Infocom Ltd recognised Indian corporate insolvency proceedings as a “foreign main proceeding,” acknowledging the Indian Resolution Professional as a foreign representative and treating the NCLT as the foreign court.35

Option 2: Parallel CIIRP and English RP

The CIIRP, when effective, can potentially be used in conjunction with an English RP to implement a cross-border debtor-led restructuring process. What will be key here is the debtor’s ability to remain in control in India (which the CIIRP provides) as well as possibly to preserve its equity interest coming out of the restructuring. The combination of an English RP with a CIIRP in India could provide a powerful cross-border restructuring framework for Indian companies with English-law-governed debt.

The recent amendments to the IBC anticipate a cross-border regime once effective and when relevant rules are notified. This bodes well for the recognition of an English RP in India, as in Fossil, U.S. courts have recognized an English RP as a “foreign proceeding” under Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, which is based on the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency as well.36

Option 3: English RP and recognition in India

This option would be more attractive for Indian companies with a significant amount of English debt in their capital structure. In this scenario, the company would propose an English RP in the UK and seek to have the English RP recognized in India. 

The advantage to this approach is that existing management will remain in control of the company during the restructuring process. 

The key issue under this option is whether an English RP would be recognized in India. This is relevant to (i) the exercise of the English court’s discretion to sanction the English RP (i.e., the English court will not sanction the English RP if there is no reasonable prospect of recognition in India), and (ii) the extent of recognition and assistance that can be provided by the Indian courts to restrain any aggressive creditor action by dissenting English creditors in India.

The recent amendments have made it possible for recognition of foreign judgments under the IBC, subject to rules yet to be created by the Centre.37 

Foreign judgments may also be recognized under Section 44A of the (Indian) Code of Civil Procedure. Section 44A extends to any decree of a foreign court under which money is payable (a money decree). However, it is unclear whether recognition under Section 44A extends to insolvency orders, as an initiation of insolvency order is not considered a money decree.38

However, there is some evidence that the Indian courts will recognize foreign insolvency proceedings based on the principle of comity39. In the Toshiaki Aiba judgment40 in 2022, the High Court of Delhi granted recognition to a bankruptcy proceeding initiated in Japan on the basis of comity. Indian courts have applied the principle of comity in many cases, including in Mahmood Hussain Khan v Madam Canisia Ceizar, where an auction sale over Indian properties in a Swiss insolvency process was recognized by an Indian court.41

Courts may also look at ad hoc proceedings of recognition where warranted. As discussed above, in the case of Jet Airways, the Indian court recognized parallel Dutch insolvency proceedings in relation to the airline and directed coordination and cooperation between the Dutch administrator and the Indian resolution professional.

In Jain Irrigation, the English High Court was satisfied that an English scheme of arrangement (a process similar to the English RP) would be granted recognition/regarded as effective in India, based on an expert report.42 

Option 4: English RP and parallel scheme of arrangement in India

An alternative would be for the company to propose a parallel scheme of arrangement in India (on similar terms to the English RP), which, if sanctioned by the Indian court, would restrict any scheme creditor from enforcing its claim in India (regardless of the governing law of the underlying debt), following the principle in New Zealand Loan and Mercantile Agency Company Limited v Morrison (1898), which still has persuasive value before Indian courts.

The (Indian) Companies Act, 2013 provides for a scheme of arrangement, which can be used as a tool for mergers, amalgamations, and corporate debtor restructuring. However, an Indian scheme of arrangement has rarely been used for debt restructuring alone. This can be attributed to several factors, such as43

  • the inability of the NCLT to impose a moratorium on debtors during a scheme of arrangement, leaving debtors exposed to creditor enforcement actions during restructuring negotiations
  • the lack of a statutory timeline for completion of the process, leading to protracted litigation and delays
  • no “clean slate” discharge for debtors, meaning debtors may remain exposed to residual or contingent liabilities not addressed in the scheme
  • class-wise voting, where the unsecured creditors, who would presumably have poor recovery, can block the scheme as they must vote with 75% consent to approve the scheme

However, despite these deficiencies, an Indian scheme of arrangement can technically be used by a promoter to restructure the debt owed by the company to specific class(es) of creditors, without losing control of the company, if the requisite majority of creditors belonging to such class(es) approves the scheme. 

Appendix — Comparison of CIRP and English RP

 

CIRP

English RP

Potential to be available to foreign / overseas company?

Debtor-in-possession

Creditor classing

Ability to choose which debts are subject to the process?

Moratorium / stay on enforcement acts

Voting thresholds

66% by value of financial creditors in CoC

75% per class of claims present / acting by proxy

Cross-class cramdown

De facto cross-class cramdown via CoC dominance but without formal class tests

Expected timeline

Statutory 330 days however, in practice often 2+ years due to litigation and delays

Typically 3–6 months from launch to sanction

Financing of operational costs during insolvency process

Treatment of shareholders

Typically wiped out; shareholders are often ineligible to participate and may suffer

Possible for shareholders to retain equity, provided this is sufficiently justified

Cross-border insolvency regime

Recognition of cross-border insolvency introduced in 2026 (to be notified soon)


1 Assisted by Rashi Priya (Associate, AZB & Partners) and Swagata Mukhopadhyay (Associate, AZB & Partners)
See the (Indian) IBC, Sections 7 (for financial creditors), 9 (for operational creditors), and 10 (for debtors).
3 See the IBC, Section 33.
4 See the IBC, Section 31.
5 See the IBC, Section 14.
6 See the IBC, Sections 16 and 18.
7 See the IBC, Section 14.
8 See the IBC, Section 21.
9 See the IBC, Section 22.
10 See the IBC, Section 20.
11 See the IBC, Section 17.
12 See the IBC, Section 28.
13 Actions requiring CoC’s prior approval (by a vote of 66% in value) include obtaining interim finance and the creation of security interest over the debtor’s assets. 
14 See the IBC, Section 31.
15 See the IBC, Section 31.
16 See the IBC, Section 21.
17 Bearing that in mind, the IBC has provisions to protect the rights of operational creditors — e.g., a resolution plan must provide a minimum payout of the amount such creditors would have received in the event of liquidation of the corporate  debtor and ensure that operational creditors are paid in priority to financial creditors.
18 The World Bank’s 2020 “Doing Business” report moved India from 108th in 2018 to 52nd regarding resolving insolvency, and recovery values improved from 15%–20% to 33% when compared with recovery rates pre-IBC.
19 Foreign companies and limited liability partnerships are not currently included in the definition of “corporate debtor” under the IBC. See for reference Insolvency Law Committee (ILC), The Report of the Insolvency Law Committee on Cross Border Insolvency, October 2018, available at https://ibbi.gov.in/uploads/resources/Report_on_Cross Border_Insolvency.pdf (ILC Report); where the ILC has recommended inclusion of foreign companies in the definition of “corporate debtor.”
20 See the IBC, Section 53.
21 See the IBC, Section 29A.
22 In respect of micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs), points (iii) and (v) above are relaxed to allow for wider eligibility criteria for promoters to submit resolution plans for debtors in that category.
23 The Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Amendment) Act, 2026, Section 40.
24 For completeness, the prepack insolvency resolution process (PPIRP) is also an insolvency process in India that permits the promoter to remain in control of the debtor. However, given that the PPIRP applies only to MSMEs and is therefore generally not applicable to Indian conglomerates, we have not covered the PPIRP for purposes of this Update.
25 This list has not been notified at present.
26 See the IBC, Section 58K(1), read with Section 28.
27 See the IBC, Section 58B(3).
28 See the IBC, Section 58E.
29 See the IBC, Section 58F(2).
30 “Sufficient connection” can be achieved by (i) having (a) English group entities accede as guarantors and execute deeds of contribution or a deed poll, or (b) English entities become co-issuers, in respect of the debt; (ii) the company’s “centre of main interests” being changed to England and Wales or (iii) changing the debt governing law to English law — it is not necessary for the company’s entire indebtedness to comprise of English law debt for the test to be met.
31 US$150m of existing bonds were replaced with new longer-dated notes while bringing in US$32.5m of new money. Fossil’s English RP was recognized and given full effect by the U.S. courts in November 2025.
32 See Jet Airways (India) Limited v State Bank of India, 2019 SCC OnLine NCLAT 1216.
33 The Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Amendment) Act, 2026, Section 71.
34 Cross Border Insolvency Rules/ Regulations Committee, Report on the rules and regulations for cross-border insolvency resolution, June 2020, available at https://ibbi.gov.in/uploads/whatsnew/2021-11-23-215206-0clh9-6e353aefb83dd0138211640994127c27.pdf.
35 See Re Compuage Infocom Ltd and Anr, [2025] SGHC 49.
36 See Clifford Chance, Crossing Borders:  U.S. Public Company Successfully Implements UK Restructuring Plan in the U.S. Through Chapter 15 Recognition, December 4, 2025, available at https://www.cliffordchance.com/content/dam/cliffordchance/briefings/2025/12/Crossing%20Borders%20-%20U.S.%20Public%20Company%20Successfully%20Implements%20UK%20Restructuring%20Plan%20in%20the%20U.S.%20Through%20Chapter%2015%20Recognition.pdf.
37 The Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Amendment) Act, 2026, Section 71.
38 See Rajendra Barot, Suharsh Sinha, and Anusha Jegadeesh, How to Obtain Recognition of a Foreign Insolvency Process and How to Enforce Insolvency Related Judgments (India), available at https://www.azbpartners.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/How-to-Obtain-Recognition-of-a-Foreign-Insolvency-Process-and-How-to-Enforce-Insolvency-Related-Judgments-India-w-037-0417.pdf.
39 India does have a general statutory regime for recognition of foreign judgments — the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC). Although recognition via the CPC has not been tested before in the context of an insolvency judgment, it is anticipated that there would be hurdles in demonstrating that such judgment meets the definitional threshold of a “decree” for purposes of the CPC.
40 See Toshiaki Aiba v Vipan Kumar Sharma, 2022 SCC OnLine Delhi 1260.
41 See Mahmood Hussain Khan v Madam Canisia Ceizar, CCCA No.47 of 2021.
42 See Re Jain International Trading BV [2021] EWHC 3636 (Ch).
43 See Umakanth Varottil, The Scheme of Arrangement as a Debt Restructuring Tool in India: Problems and Prospects, NUS Centre for Law & Business Working Paper 17/02, March 2017.

律师广告—Sidley Austin LLP 是一家全球性律师事务所。我们的地址及联系方式可在 www.sidley.com/en/locations/offices 查阅。

Sidley 提供本信息仅作为向客户及其他友好人士提供的服务,且仅供教育目的使用。本信息不应被解释或依赖为法律意见,亦不构成律师与客户关系。读者在未寻求专业顾问意见之前,不应依据本信息采取任何行动。Sidley 和 Sidley Austin 指 Sidley Austin LLP 及其关联合伙实体,详见 www.sidley.com/disclaimer

© Sidley Austin LLP

联系我们

如果您对本次 Sidley 更新有任何疑问,请联系您平时合作的 Sidley 律师,或

Chandrapala, Dhevine
Registered Foreign Lawyer (England & Wales) / Partner, Sidley Austin LLP